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3 
Capital adequacy regulation and financial 
conglomerates 






A topical concern in public-policy debate is that the current capital adequacy 
regulation designed for stand-alone financial institutions exhibits several 
weaknesses due to the emergence of large financial institutions combining several 
activities under common control. This paper addresses these concerns using a 
theoretical framework derived from the economic literature. I will first describe 
the possible causes of the emergence of financial conglomerates, proceed to 
consider the theoretical background for the regulation of financial institutions, 
especially insurance and banking companies, and, finally, examine the limitations 
of the current regulatory framework in controlling the risks in financial 
conglomerates. My conclusions provide little support for the view that the 
regulatory approach should be modified towards a more consolidated one (ie 
harmonization). 
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4 
Finanssiryhmittymien vakavaraisuusvalvonta 






Pankeille ja vakuutuslaitoksille suunniteltujen vakavaraisuusvaatimusten sopivuus 
finanssiryhmittymien valvontaan on noussut tärkeäksi aiheeksi rahoituslaitosten 
vakavaraisuusvalvonnan suunnittelussa. Tässä keskustelualoitteessa tarkastellaan 
taloustieteellisestä näkökulmasta finanssiryhmittymien toimintaa ja tuodaan esille 
ongelmia, jotka tulisi ottaa huomioon finanssiryhmittymille suunniteltavissa vaka-
varaisuusvaatimuksissa. Alussa käsitellään lyhyesti finanssiryhmittymien synty-
mistä ja niiden muodostumisen edellytyksiä. Tämän jälkeen esitellään vakavarai-
suusvalvonnan talousteoreettiset perustelut sekä pankki- että vakuutustoiminnan 
tapauksissa. Keskustelualoitteen viimeisissä luvuissa tarkastellaan teoreettisesta 
näkökulmasta vallitsevien valvontaperiaatteiden soveltuvuutta finanssiryhmitty-
miin. Johtopäätöksenä on, että pankki- ja vakuutustoiminnan vakavaraisuusvaatei-
den yhtenäistämiselle finanssiryhmittymissä ei ole vahvoja teoreettisia tai empiiri-
siä perusteluja. 
 
Avainsanat: finanssiryhmittymät, pankkitoiminta, vakavaraisuusvaateet, vakuu-
tustoiminta 
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In the recent decades, ﬁnancial markets have changed shape as the providers
of ﬁnancial services have extended their scope of activities. Before this
development took place a ﬁnancial institution could relatively easily be deﬁned
as a bank, a securities company, or an insurance company, but recently such
categorization has become less clear. The new organizational arrangements are
known as ﬁnancial conglomerates.1 The emergence of ﬁnancial conglomerates
has been driven by competitive pressures in the traditional banking sector
and synergies across complementary ﬁnancial services that helped ﬁnancial
institutions to capture economies of scope and scale. While the synergies may
well improve the eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial market, it is less clear whether
conglomeration changes the nature of risks inherent in these businesses.
The usual concern in the public policy debate is that conglomeration
combined with more diverse and sophisticated ﬁnancial products may leave
the ﬁnancial market exposed to unexpected risks, generating a need for
reassessing the current regulatory framework for ﬁnancial institutions. These
regulatory concerns are addressed in the ongoing Basel 2 revisions of the 1988
Basel Capital Accords. This is because regulators cannot eﬀectively apply
the standards designed for banking without some attention to the role of
conglomerates. While most supervisors admit that conglomerates deserve some
form of specialized supervision, it is less clear to what extent conglomeration
should be taken into account in capital adequacy regulation.
In this paper I will discuss ﬁnancial conglomeration and the regulatory
concerns on the basis of existing economic literature on ﬁnancial markets
and ﬁnancial regulation. Reﬂecting the European experience, I will focus
on institutions that combine insurance and banking services. To this end,
I will ﬁrst outline the developments that have led to the emergence of ﬁnancial
conglomerates. Second, to gain understanding of the theoretical foundations
that underlie the regulatory concerns I present a theoretical framework for
optimal regulation of banking and insurance markets. Finally, I examine
whether the conceptual framework of regulating ﬁnancial institutions as
stand-alone entities applies to institutions that combine diﬀerent activities and
discuss the extent to which the emergence of ﬁnancial conglomerates should
inﬂuence regulation in ﬁnancial markets.
The following section brieﬂy reviews the proposed reasons for the emergence
of ﬁnancial conglomerates. The third section ﬁrst examines the economic
principles underlying the reasons for the existence of insurers and banks and
discusses the theoretical framework for their regulation. Section four discusses
the regulation of ﬁnancial conglomerates. Section ﬁve concludes.
1The Joint Forum (2001a) deﬁnes ﬁnancial conglomerate as any group of companies under
common control whose exclusive or predominant activities consists of providing signiﬁcant
services in at least two diﬀerent ﬁnancial sectors (banking, securities, insurance).
72 The fomation of ﬁnancial conglomerates
There are three structural forms according to which ﬁnancial conglomerates
are organized. One form is the universal bank, in which all operations
are centralized within a single corporate entity. The second form is the
parent subsidiary model, in which operations are conducted in subsidiaries
of parent companies which are usually banks. Finally, in a holding
company model businesses are conducted in legally distinct entities each with
separate management and capital, but owned by a (potentially unregulated)
corporation.
Diversiﬁcation of business lines in ﬁnancial markets has been a rather
unique phenomenon as we have been witnessing in recent years a general
trend towards less diversiﬁed international corporations. For instance, the
Finnish corporation Nokia has changed its organizational form dramatically
from a diversiﬁed conglomerate that sold, among other things, rubber boots
and tires, to a world-leading telecommunications company. In the case of
ﬁnancial industry, conglomeration has been motivated by economic beneﬁts
of combining diﬀerent ﬁnancial activities under one roof so as to capture
economies of scale and scope across business lines. These economies are
generated by higher operational eﬃciency and by innovation of products that
allow, for instance, capitalizing on consumers’ willingness to pay for ‘one-stop
shopping’ (See Berger et al 1996). Conglomerates’ proﬁt may also be less
volatile at a group level insofar as they can eﬃciently diversify their risk and
revenue proﬁles.2
One source of higher operational eﬃciency is information advantages.
Information advantages arise from ﬁnancial conglomerates’ ability to oﬀer a
broader set of information-relevant ﬁnancial services to their clients than they
would on stand-alone basis. For instance, when a bank or an insurer establishes
a relationship with a client it incurs costs in gathering information about the
client. An institution that combines these services can reduce these costs by
using a common information system and reusing gathered information.3
Empirical evidence on the information advantages is scarce, but there
are a few papers conﬁrming the hypothesis that information generated in
relationships between ﬁnancial conglomerates and clients can be an important
source of cost reductions. Jappelli and Pagano (2002) use cross-country data
and show that information-sharing diminishes the adverse selection problem
inherent in credit-relationships and reduces the default rate in credit market.
Hence, it is plausible to think that if production of a more diverse set of
services entails sharing relevant information, ﬁnancial conglomeration should
generate information beneﬁts. Indeed, Mester, Nakamura and Renault (2002)
ﬁnd empirical support for the argument that information gathered from
diﬀerent ﬁnancial services gives an advantage for institutions that combine
these services over other lending institutions. The study reports that banks
can gather information on borrowers through checking account services which
2There are, however, a number of reasons why more specialized ﬁnancial institutions
exhibit superior operational eﬃciency.
3It should, however, be noted that in some countries the sharing of information between
ﬁnancial services is limited by public regulation.
8give banks an information advantage over other lenders in terms of mitigating
the monitoring problem with loans. Vander Vennet (2002) provides similar
evidence in the case of European ﬁnancial conglomerates and establishes that
they have an information advantage over specialized institutions due to their
superior ability to monitor and thereby reduce moral-hazard among borrowers.
Economies of scope on the production side arise whenever costs can be
shared across product lines. Berger (2000) surveys the literature and identiﬁes
several cost-eﬃciency gains associated with combining multiple product lines.
First, a ﬁnancial conglomerate with a common information system that can
be used across product lines incurs the cost of gathering information only
once. Second, delivery, marketing and physical inputs can be combined in
production of a larger set of services. Finally, whenrisks in diﬀerent services are
imperfectly correlated, there is a potential for economies in risk management
through a diversiﬁed risk portfolio. However, Berger (2000) also points out
that in general the results are mixed.
A ﬁnancial institution that combines diﬀerent activities can be more stable
than a specialized institution due to risk diversiﬁcation. T h i si sb e c a u s et h e
correlation between the return of diﬀerent ﬁnancial activities is imperfect.
In theory, it follows that earnings should become less volatile as the scope
of activities generating them becomes more diverse. Allen and Jagtiani
(2000) estimate the potential for diversiﬁcation beneﬁts for US bank holding
companies. The study establishes that oﬀering more services may indeed
reduce the overall risk, but leaves the companies exposed to higher systematic
risk that outweighs the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts. Stiroh (2002) provides evidence
that US banks have not gained much from their shift away from a traditional
net interest income during the past twenty years.4
Economies of scope on the consumption side of the market emerge if buying
ﬁnancial services from the same institution beneﬁts consumers through reduced
search, information and monitoring costs. Furthermore, a standard theory
of a multi-product ﬁrm predicts that ﬁnancial conglomerates may engage in
cross-subsidization across product lines allowing consumers to negotiate for
better deals.5 Finally, consumers may beneﬁt from lower product prices,
insofar as the market is competitive enough for cost-reductions associated with
conglomeration to pass through to prices.
Although the empirical evidence and theoretical predictions on potential
gains generated by ﬁnancial conglomeration is ambiguous, these organizations
have gained importance in recent years as cross-sectoral consolidation in
ﬁnancial industry has been gathering pace in recent decade.6 Lown et
al (2000) record that between 1985 and 1999, banks consolidating with
other banks accounted for 49% of total mergers and acquisitions activity
in Europe. Cross-sectoral consolidation accounted for 24% of total mergers
and acquisitions, indicating that conglomeration has been a notable trend
in the ﬁnancial markets. In Scandinavia, ﬁnancial conglomerates have
4For a survey of the relevant literature, see eg Kwan and Laderman (1999).
5See, for instance Tirole (1988) and in the case of banking Chiappori et al (1995).
6If the lack of robust empirical evidence on the conglomeration-beneﬁts indicates that
such economies do not exist, then we should expect to see some degree of disintegration of
large ﬁnancial conglomerates into retail-banks and insurers.
9captured a notable share of ﬁnancial markets. For instance, in year 2000
ﬁnancial conglomerates held 79% and 67% of deposit markets in Finland and
Sweden, respectively.7 At the same time the US ﬁnancial sector exhibited
less cross-sectoral consolidation. Lown et al (2000) argue that this is
due to legal barriers that were in place until the implementation of the
Gramm-Leach-Bailey act, which allows for a wider scope of ﬁnancial services
to occur within the same business group.
3 The regulation of ﬁnancial institutions
Financial conglomerates have captured a signiﬁcant share of ﬁnancial markets
in most industrialized countries. This has raised concerns that ﬁnancial
regulation is lagging behind and thereby making the ﬁnancial market subject
to unexpected failures. Since eﬃcient and stable ﬁnancial system is vital for all
modern economies, the potential for market failures constitutes an important
issue in public-policy discussion.8
Financial institutions are regulated and supervised for several overlapping
reasons. The most important are consumer protection and the provision of
correct market incentives. These reasons are linked to the special nature of
ﬁnancial products and the vulnerability of the ﬁnancial system to information
imperfections, which may under speciﬁc circumstances lead to market failures
that induce signiﬁcant social costs both in ﬁnancial and real sector.
Although few disagree with the notion that ﬁnancial market is vulnerable
to failures, there are two opposite views on the justiﬁcation for ﬁnancial
regulation. Critics of regulation argue that a free ﬁnancial market provides
agents with correct incentives and in the case of potential market failures
the costs are not high enough to oﬀset the deadweight loss generated by
the regulation.9 Most ﬁnancial supervisors, however, argue that ﬁnancial
stability is at risk under a free ﬁnancial market and failures of ﬁnancial
institutions are extremely costly to tax-payers. Therefore, ﬁnancial institutions
should be regulated through prudential regulation or the conduct of business
regulation.10 The former aims to promote solvency among ﬁnancial institutions
and prudential regulation provides a more protected business environment for
the consumers.11
In what follows I consider reasons for the regulation of ﬁnancial
conglomerates on the basis of existing theoretical literature on ﬁnancial
regulation. Reﬂecting the European practice, I will focus on ﬁnancial
7See, van Lelyveld and Schilder (2002). These numbers are likely to rise due to
cross-border consolidation of Scandinavian ﬁnancial institutions.
8King and Levine (1993); and Rajan and Zingales (1998) establish that ﬁnancial
development is an important determinant of countries’ economic growth. Rajan and Zingales
(2001) and Hyytinen et al (2003) discuss the extent to which ﬁnancial development inﬂuences
the nature and behavior of ﬁrms.
9See, for example, Glasner (1989).
10This argument is put forward by several authors eg Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
11For information on the contemporary challenges in ﬁnancial regulation with an attention
to the recent ﬁnancial crisis in Scandinavian countries, see Mayes et al (2001).
10conglomerates that combine banking and insurance services.12 I will
ﬁrst brieﬂy review the theoretical foundations of banking and insurance
activities. Second, given the potential for market failures in these businesses
I will examine the proposed regulatory framework for stand-alone ﬁnancial
institutions. These considerations establish the conceptual background for the
analysis of capital adequacy regulation of ﬁnancial conglomerates.
3.1 Banks and ﬁnancial intermediation
There are, in particular, two well established reasons why ﬁnancial
intermediaries such as banks are valuable for the society: Banks are valuable
in their role as a provider of liquidity insurance and as a delegated monitor
to investors. The idea of provision of liquidity insurance and banking is
put forward by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Depositors have excess capital
which gives them an incentive to invest in ﬁnancial market, but they are
subject to liquidity shocks due to uncertainty about the timing of their
consumption decisions. Since the maturity of direct investment is usually
rather long and rigid, the depositors are willing to pay for a liquidity-insurance
w h i c ha l l o w st h e mt ow i t h d r a wt h e i rf u n d sa ta n yg i v e nd a t e . B a n k sc a n
establish such ex ante commitment to meet the claims through maturity
transformation. Maturity transformation refers to transformation of assets
with short maturities into assets with long maturities, desired by depositors
and borrowers, respectively.
Banks’ value as delegated monitors to investors is generated through
preventing the duplication of monitoring costs (Diamond 1984).13 The
reasoning is that ﬁrms (borrowers) usually have superior information about
the project than investors. Since information acquisition is costly, investors
rather delegate the monitoring task to the bank through which the ﬁrm raises
its funding. This improves the eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial market, for banks can
save on monitoring costs and make funding available to ﬁrms at a lower cost.
Among others, these theories of market imperfections provide the
justiﬁcation for the existence of banks which have the ability to exploit the
imperfections. It cannot, however, be ruled out that market for ﬁnancial
intermediation is subject to failures. The mechanisms driving the failures
are closely related to market imperfections in banking and the special nature
of banking services.
The inherent problem that generates market failures in banking is that of
asymmetric information between banks and its most important debt-holders,
depositors. In an ideal situation depositors could perfectly observe the risk
their bank is taking and demand a speciﬁc rate of return for their deposits
12Traditionally European banks fell under the label ‘universal bank’, ie an institution that
combines securities and banking activities. Extending the scope into insurance business has
been more recent phenomenon.
13A similar point was made by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) who argue that banks are
better in screening the borrowers than the average investor.
11on the basis of the observed risk-portfolio.14 Under such perfect market
environment the interest rates would perfectly reﬂect the banks’ risk taking
and thereby provide incentives for banks to invest prudentially. However, in
real world depositors tend to have limited information on banks’ ﬁnancial
status which generates a distortion in the form of moral hazard, which shows
up in ineﬃciently risky investment portfolios and increased potential for bank
insolvency.
The problem of asymmetric information is common in most credit
relationships, but in the case of bank-depositor relationship it is exacerbated
for the following reasons. First, recall that the existence of ﬁnancial
intermediaries is based on liquidity insurance which, in turn, implies that
depositors are entitled to an immediate withdrawal of funds at any given date.
It follows that deposits are partially insuredinthe sense that banks are required
to compensate depositors insofar as the liquidation value of bank’s assets is
large enough to cover the claims. Secondly, depositors have a ﬁrst-come,
ﬁrst-served right to withdraw their funds. These privileges combined with
the features that depositors have imperfect information about their bank’s
balance sheet, where the liquidation value of its assets is less than the value of
the liquid deposits, leaves the banks exposed to runs.15
Bank runs are a result of panics generated by depositors’ imperfect
information about banks’ risk portfolio and liquidity insurance oﬀered by their
bank. The mechanism is straightforward. Depositors observe that regardless
of the bank’s ﬁnancial status, it is required to return the assets of each client.
If the bank, however, cannot meet its liabilities in full, the value of depositors’
assets depend on the timing of the withdrawal. When each depositor has the
same conjecture, a widespread withdrawal may occur as a rational response by
depositors. Such withdrawal can be triggered by adverse information about the
bank’s ﬁnancial condition as depositors are induced to withdraw their assets
in the fear that other depositors will do so ﬁrst.
A bank failure generates negative externalities for it destroys economic
value and it may lead to further contagion losses. Contagion may occur both
because of a change in depositors expectations on bank returns and because
of banks’ ﬁnancial interdependence. It is important to note that a change in
depositors’ expectations leading to ﬁnancial contagion can also be rational.
For instance, if a bank failure serves as an adverse signal on bank-assets in
general, depositors are induced to update their beliefs, whereby widespread
withdrawal may occur in solvent banks as well.16 Furthermore, in the presence
of reciprocal claims between ﬁnancial institutions, these claims may serve
as a channel through which a ﬁnancial crisis of one institution may propagate to
14The main risks to which banks are exposed are interest rate/market risk, liquidity risk
and credit risk, as well as broader systemic risk. The credit risk refers to a risk that
counterparty fails to fully discharge terms of the contract. Interest rate risk derives from
variation of market prices owing to interest rate change. Market risk is a more general term
for risk of market price shifts. Liquidity risk is a potential for asset owner to be unable to
recover the full value of asset.
15See Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
16See eg Chari and Jagannathan (1988).
12other institutions and lead to further runs.17 These considerations imply that
a failure of a single bank may aﬀect both the real and the perceived stability
of the ﬁnancial system.
3.1.1 Regulation
An eﬀective regulatory mechanism prevents widespread withdrawals resulting
from panics and provides correct incentives for banks to invest prudentially.
Deposit insurance limits bank-fragility by ensuring that depositors are not
subject to loss in the case of a bank-failure. It thus insulates banks from runs as
depositors are not subject to panics. Deposit insurance, however, exacerbates
banks’ excessive risk-taking, for depositors’ have diminished incentives to
monitor banks’ ﬁnancial status. This generates a moral hazard eﬀect on the
ﬁnancial market as depositors do not demand a higher interest rate in exchange
for the higher risk of bank insolvency, and hence, lack of market discipline
diminishes banks’ incentives to invest prudentially.18
Capital adequacy regulation can be used to mitigate the moral hazard eﬀect
for it is an instrument that generates a price for the activities a bank otherwise
would ignore. Lack of market discipline implies that the rate of return on
depositors’ assets does not reﬂect bank’s insolvency risk; hence the banks’
risk-taking is not priced on the market.19 However, when capital requirements
are in place, a bank failure implies losses to shareholders which are therefore
more concerned about the banks’ excessive risk-taking inducing the bank to
undertake more prudential investments.20 Capital adequacy regulation also
prevents bank runs in the sense that it serves as a commitment device for
banks to hold suﬃcient liquid funds to meet depositors’ claims in full and thus
prevents the depositor panics.
Berger et al (1995) deﬁne an ideal capital adequacy requirement as a
mandatory requirement that reﬂects the marginal social beneﬁt of reducing the
risk of the negative externalities generated by bank failures and the marginal
social cost in terms of increased deadweight-loss. Since the design of such
regulatory system is a virtually impossible task, the usual framework entails
uniform ratios below which banks are subject to regulatory sanctions, and these
minimum ratios remain relatively stable over time. There are several papers
that elaborate the implications of ﬂat and risk-based capital requirements
on banks’ risk-taking. Among others Furlong and Keeley (1989) show that
ﬂat capital requirements indeed reduce banks risk-taking, but they fail to
17For information on ﬁnancial contagion in the case of interbank lending, see eg Allen and
Gale (2000); and Rochet and Tirole (1996).
18If the deposit insurance premium is not sensitive to risks, banks have an incentive to
increase the risk, which leads to implicit subsidization of high-risk banks on the expense
of low-risk ones. However, when there is asymmetric information, the existence of such
premium is questionable. For instance, Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1992), show that
incentive compatible premiums do not generally exist.
19This eﬀect is further pronounced when deposit insurance is in place, as depositors have
no incentives to monitor bank.
20See, eg Hellman, Murdoch and Stiglitz (2000); Holmström and Tirole (1997) and Rochet
(1992).
13completely diminish the moral-hazard incentives. Some argue, however, that
ﬂat capital requirements tend to exacerbate banks’ risk taking as banks have
an incentive to compensate the diminished return through investing in riskier
assets.21 More recently, Kim and Santomero (1988) and Rochet (1992) have
pointed out that risk-based capital adequacy requirements can eliminate the
risk taking incentives, provided that the risk-weights are chosen correctly.
The current regulatory system in EU is based on Basel Capital Accords
which applies the above conceptual framework for European credit institutions.
According to Basel 1, credit institutions are obliged to continually meet speciﬁc
minimum capital adequacy ratios which depend on the nature of the risk of
the banks’ assets and the deﬁnitions of eligible capital. The deﬁnition of
eligible capital consists of Tiers 1 and 2. Tier 1 capital refers to a core capital
including shareholders’ equity and retained earnings. These categories are
public information and they appear in the annual accounts of the bank. Tier
2 capital refers to a supplementary capital representing other elements which
fall short of the characteristics of the core capital, but which contribute to the
overall strength of the bank. Total Tier 2 capital cannot exceed Tier 1 capital.
To illustrate the calculation of the capital adequacy ratio consider a bank’s
credit risk exposure to an ‘A’ rated counterparty. According to Basel 1, the
capital adequacy ratio for such risk exposure is 8% indicating that for each
Euro invested in a risky project the bank is required to add 8 cents equity to
its own capital. Since Tier 2 capital cannot exceed the core capital, 8% ratio
implies a minimum Tier 1 capital requirement equal to 4% of outstandings.
The ongoing (Basel 2) revisions of the Basel 1 capital accord put more
emphasis on incentive-based regulatory mechanisms. The new framework is set
to ensure the stability of the ﬁnancial system by improving market discipline
through linking capital adequacy requirements more closely with the risks in
the banks assets and providing market-based incentives to improve their risk
management capabilities. Furthermore, BIS 1 only covered internationally
active banks. Harmonization across all sectors in the ﬁnancial industry is one
of the focuses of the Basel 2 which aims to implement detailed disclosure and
capital adequacy requirements for all operational components of a bank. In a
holding-company level the revisions thus indicate a move toward a regulatory
system that is more risk-sensitive by business class and asset class.
To summarize the discussion, banking theory deﬁnes banks as institutions
providing investment and maturities transformation services. The nature
of ﬁnancial intermediation, however, leaves banks exposed to runs which
may emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon. Since failures are socially
costly, a few mechanisms have been suggested to insulate banks from runs.
Deposit insurance is an eﬃcient instrument to prevent widespread withdrawals
resulting from panics, but it leads to ineﬃciently high risk-taking in the
ﬁnancial market in the form of moral hazard. A regulator can inﬂuence the
banks’ risk-taking by imposing minimum capital standards. Capital adequacy
standards generate a cost for the risk the banks are willing to take and
therefore shift the risk-portfolio toward the one that obtains when depositors
could observe risk-taking of their bank. The current regulatory framework
21This argument is put forward by Koehn and Santomero (1980).
14is based on BIS 1. The regulation requires banks to continually meet a
speciﬁc minimum capital adequacy ratio, which determines the amount and
the structure of the solvency reserve for speciﬁc risk exposures. The Basel 2
capital adequacy framework is aimed to emphasize risk management and to
encourage ongoing improvement in risk assessment capabilities of banks and
other ﬁnancial institutions.
3.2 Insurance markets
The existence of insurance market follows directly from that risk-averse
individuals are willing to pay at least a fair premium to ensure a compensation
should a speciﬁc event occur in the future. An insurer supplies a contract which
details a future payment under speciﬁed circumstances. Such contract entails
g a i n so ft r a d ei n s o f a ra st h ep r e m i u mp a i di sa tl e a s ta sh i g ha st h ee x p e c t e d
loss to the insurer. Premiums charged to all policy-holders are redistributed
to those who are entitled to payments.22
Insurance markets take many forms as the motivation for buying insurance
diﬀers between agents. Insurance policies can be divided into three classes.
In life insurance annuities component is a contract that details a payments
at speciﬁc dates, provided that the policy-holder is still alive. Life insurance
contract can also entail a ﬁxed payment to speciﬁc parties in case of death of
the policy holder. Life insurance is thus a form of savings driven by bequest
and retirement incentives. It is natural to analyze life insurance decisions as
savings decisions in a similar framework as banking.
Business insurance policy is a method of sharing and reallocating of
risk between or within businesses. Business insurance arrangements entail
credit-risk transfer between banks and insurers,23 reinsurance24 and direct
insurance contracts between insurers and businesses. Since business insurance
covers a wide range of business-speciﬁc risks, it is thus plausible to consider the
market as contracting in a bilateral bargaining and game theoretic framework.
Property and casualty insurance consists of a wide range of insurance
policies sold to individuals who wish to protect themselves against property
and health related losses. The market for such contracts is large and buyers
of policies tend to have little bargaining power. It follows that the variety of
policies available is often limited to few standardized contracts. It is therefore
plausible to presume that the nature of competition on the market ranges
between perfectly competitive markets to oligopoly pricing depending on the
number of active insurers.
There are several potential sources of market failures in insurance business.
22Note that for each signed policy the insurer may incur loss, the law of large numbers
indicates that when the number of contracts increases and the policy is appropriately priced,
so that the premium equals expected loss of each individual contract, the insurer gains
nonnegative proﬁt in the long-run.
23That is, banks insure themselves against credit losses.
24Reinsurance transfers a fraction of the risk associated with the initial insurance between
the primary insurer and policy holder to another insurer. When the contracts are reciprocal,
they provide an eﬃcient tool of risk diversiﬁcation for risk-averse insurers.
15Most of the theoretical research on insurance has focused on the problems
of adverse selection and moral hazard in insurance market. A number
studies elaborate the seminal work of Rotschild and Stiglitz (1976). Rotschild
and Stiglitz (1976) show that when the buyers are heterogeneous in their
accident-probabilities which is private information to the buyer, asymmetric
information between the insurer and the policy holder inhibits the design of
an eﬃcient contract. A high-risk type buyer observes that the insurer would
like to charge a higher premium from high-risk individuals, who therefore have
a disincentive to reveal their type. This distorts the market, for the insurer
cannot design a contract that induces each client to reveal their respective risk
types. The welfare loss of the distortion is that low-risk types are charged
ineﬃciently high premiums as the insurer must design a standardized contract
which does not fully reﬂect the risk associated with each individual contract.
Insurers enter the market with equity capital and issue insurance policies
which are a form of debt capital. The funds raised by issuing both types
of capital are invested, until needed to pay claims. While the primary
purpose of insurance is to be able to meet the claims at all times, they
are also exposed to a large number of risks. The solvency risks are labeled
as technical and investment risks.25 Technical risk consists of two types of
risks: under-pricing and under-provision. Under-pricing refers to situation in
which the insurer attracts buyers by setting excessively low premiums which
do not cover the expected claims. Technical provisions represent largest share
of insurers’ debt, and they are a measure of its obligations to policy-holders.
In case of under-provision, the technical provisions are inadequate to meet
the obligations. Investment risk is generated by insurers’ role as a ﬁnancial
intermediary, and reﬂects the feature that insurer is exposed to similar risk of
insolvency as banks.26
Risk of insolvency generates a market failure, when the market price does
not fully reﬂect the insolvency risk. In a world of perfect information the
economic theory proposes that competition and rational behavior ensure that
the risk should be reﬂected by consumers’ willingness to pay, and therefore,
induce eﬃcient risk-management among insurers.27 However, in order to
correctly assess the insurer’s solvency the buyer should be equipped with
a suﬃcient data on the joint distribution of loss claims; the return on the
insurer’s asset portfolio; and technical reserves the insurer will hold at the time
of payment of beneﬁts. Such information is in practice costly or unavailable
for buyers. It is thus plausible to think that they cannot fully assess the
ﬁnancial strength of their insurer and thereby the quality of the insurance
25In addition to investment and technical risks, the insurer is exposed to risk of default
by partner (eg reinsurer), risk of mismanagement and systemic risk.
26Insurer’s role as a ﬁnancial intermediary is generated by the lapse between collection of
premiums and payment of beneﬁts. If the lapse is suﬃciently long, the insurer can invest
the premiums in ﬁnancial market until the asset must be liquidated to match the claim
speciﬁed in the contract. In case of life insurance, the model is almost identical to Diamond
and Dybvig (1983). However, life insurers are less vulnerable to runs, because termination
of life insurance policy is often costly and the contract does not entail a liquidity insurance
component, ie the policy-holder does not have the right to demand immediate repayment of
debt.
27See eg Rees et al (1999).
16contract. It should be noted that the problem of asymmetric information
about insolvency is exactly the opposite to the information problem addressed
in most of the literature on insurance market (eg Rotschild and Stiglitz 1976),
but it is closely related to the market distortions in banking which are driven
by lack of transparency.
3.2.1 Solvency regulation in insurance
In theory of banking excessive risk-taking is driven by the feature that
unsophisticated depositors do not price the risk the bank is taking. In
insurance business the unsophisticated counterparts are the buyers of personal
insurance who cannot properly assess the insurance companies’ ﬁnancial
strength in relation to their prices.28 It follows that insurance premiums do not
fully reﬂect the risk of insurer insolvency; hence, the shareholders of insurance
companies have diminished incentives to maintain low risk-levels insofar as
their own assets are not at risk in case of insolvency.29 As in the case of
banking and deposit insurance, the moral hazard increases with insolvency
guarantees set up by the state or insurance companies themselves, for these
funds further reduce the policy-holders’ incentives to consider the insurers’
ﬁnancial strength when buying insurance policies.
There are several arguments for and against capital adequacy regulation
in the insurance business. The advocates of free insurance market claim that
the problem of asymmetric information is less severe than in banking and
bank failures are more costly because insurers’ role in the economy is less
signiﬁcant than that of banks. Rees and Kessner (1999) and comments therein
provides a good overview of the conceptual issues associated with insurance
regulation. Rees and Kessner argue for free insurance market on the basis
of some theoretical studies and a support of an empirical exercise comparing
the performance of the relatively tightly regulated German market and the
unregulated market in United Kingdom.
The argument put forward by Rees and Kessner follows Rees et al (1999),
which is one of the few theoretical studies that examine insurance solvency
regulation. In short, the formal analysis establishes that in the absence of
asymmetric information about insurers’ risk portfolio, regulation can only
exert distortional eﬀects on insurance markets. The reason is that the buyers
are always willing to pay for an insurance that guarantees solvency. Each
insurer observes that exposure to insolvency risk diminishes their demand for
any given price level, and therefore, they create enough capital reserves to
ensure solvency. Hence, the insurers’ economic capital decision is eﬃcient and
regulation can only impose deadweight loss on the market. The theoretical
28Personal insurance refers to large scale life insurance and property and liability insurance
market. It is plausible to think that large businesses are better equipped to evaluate the
insurers’ ﬁnancial status, which allows them to condition the contract on the insurers’
risk-taking.
29For instance, Hellman, Murdoch and Stiglitz (2000); and Repullo (2003) argue that
ﬁnancial institutes have an incentive to voluntary limit risk, insofar as it increases the
charter value of the institute.
17argument that solvency regulation is ineﬃcient relies on the presumption
that the consumers are fully informed about the insolvency risk.30 However,
comments by Paul Klemperer and Carmen Matutes exhibit less conﬁdence on
this assumption that drives the argument for deregulation. In their opinion it
is too optimistic to assume that consumers can fully understand the solvency
risk for they tend to have limited incentives or ability to use the relevant
information.
In what comes to empirical evidence on eﬃciency in German and UK
insurance market, Rees and Kessner establish that deregulated British
insurance market is more eﬃcient than German market. However, as Paul
Klemperer points out in his comment the evidence is not conclusive enough
to debunk the arguments for regulation. For instance, the study employs data
for a rather short period (1992—1994), which allows for several measurement
errors and market-speciﬁc trends. In addition to the methodological issues
the study neglects the social cost of potential insurance failures which is one
of the primary reasons for ﬁnancial regulation in the ﬁrst place. Grace et al
(2003) consider the cost of insurance company failures during 1986—1999. The
study reports that the magnitude of losses of insolvency incurred by insurance
guarantee funds is relatively higher than in case of other ﬁnancial institutions.31
This result provides an important qualiﬁcation to the argument put forward
by Rees and Kessner which implicitly claims that eﬃciency beneﬁts achieved
under free market outweigh the potential costs associated with insurance
company failures.
Despite the arguments for a ‘free insurance market’, insurance solvency
regulation is a common practice in most industrialized countries.32 In the
EU the insurance solvency regulation is largely harmonized, but it leaves
some latitude for application in the case of certain policies. To illustrate the
diﬀerence between capital adequacy requirements in banking and insurance it
is useful to consider the management of identical risk in these businesses.
Suppose that a bank transfers its credit risk exposure to an ‘A’ rated
counterparty to insurance company through credit insurance.33 Suppose
further that the insurer observes the borrower’s default probability and sets a
fair premium equal to expected loss, say, 5% of the outstandings.
The EU regulation requires the insurance company to hold equity capital
equal to 16% of the gross premiums written annually.34 The amount of
premiums written is a natural approximation for the technical risk in insurance
insofar as insurers do not engage in underpricing of policies. However, although
the risk-exposure reﬂected by the premium is identical to the insurer and to
the bank, the annual capital adequacy ratio for the insurer is 0.8% which is
considerably lower than the bank’s 4% solvency ratio.
30Rees and Kessner (1999) justify the assumption by the feature that in most countries
collect and publish the relevant data so as to diminish the information problem.
31Grace et al (2003) show that on average insurance guarantee funds incurred a cost equal
to 1.30$ per 1$ asset invested the companies before insolvency.
32See eg OECD (2002).
33This form ‘credit-risk transfer’ has become a common trend in ﬁnancial market.
34For more detailed information on various approaches to insurance solvency regulation,
see OECD (2003).
18There are a number of explanations for the regulatory diﬀerence between
these sectors. First, as opposed to banks, insurers are less vulnerable to
contagious runs that would lead to a system-wide ﬁnancial distress, hence
the industry is considered more stable and thereby lower level of regulatory
capital is an appropriate policy instrument. Second, the technical risks of an
insurance company might be less correlated than banks’ credit risks, making
the insurer less vulnerable to unexpected shifts in its risk distribution. Third,
insurers have better ability to diversify their risk-portfolio through, for instance
reinsurance. Finally, there is a potential that the existing solvency regulation
in insurance business is lagging behind as it fails anticipate the eﬀect of the
new ﬁnancial instruments which bring the risk-portfolio of the insurers closer
to that of the banks.
To summarize, although insolvency risk in insurance business is becoming
similar to risks in banking, it is less clear to what extent capital adequacy
regulation is needed to insulate the market for these risks. The advocates
for a free insurance market argue that since insurers do not provide liquidity
insurance, there is no counterpart for bank runs in insurance business. The
second notion in favor for free insurance market is that a large proportion
of debt-holders in insurance companies consist of sophisticated investors who
can evaluate the company’s ﬁnancial strength, implying that insurance market
should provide better incentives for eﬃcient risk management. Those in favor
of strict insurance regulation claim that lack of market discipline in insurance
market may give raise to costly failures that may propagate to other ﬁnancial
sectors through new and more sophisticated ﬁnancial products such as credit
risk derivatives. The current EU regulatory approach, however, seems to
support the idea that capital adequacy standards should be lower in insurance
than in banking. That is, although some of the risk exposures in both
businesses may well be identical, the current regulation requires insurers to
hold less equity capital than banks. In the case of ﬁnancial conglomerates this
generates an incentive for regulatory arbitrage if the risks can be transferred
between the product lines.
4 The regulation of ﬁnancial conglomerates
The previous section outlines the theoretical principles for solvency
regulation of insurance companies and banks as stand-alone entities. The
current regulatory approach, the so-called silo-approach, adopted in most
industrialized countries is consistent with these principles. That is, in the
case of insurance companies the regulatory requirements are identical to
each ﬁrm operating in the same sector, regardless of their organizational
arrangements.35 Although the concept of the silo-approach lies on solid
theoretical foundations, the emergence of more complex and larger institutions
has blurred the boundaries between ﬁnancial sectors which arguably presents
a number challenges for the regulators.
35See eg Joint Forum (2001b)
19While the regulatory challenges have been pronounced in the public policy
debate, the empirical evidence and theoretical predictions on the impact
of conglomeration on ﬁnancial stability is ambiguous. The discussion has,
broadly, focused on the limitations of the silo-approach and on the regulatory
implications of emergence of larger and more complex institutions in the form
of ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF) policies. The following subsections treat these
concerns in more detail within the conceptual framework for capital adequacy
regulation described in section three.
4.1 Potential limitations of silo-approach
This section discusses the potential limitations of the silo-approach and
elaborates the extent to which these limitations constitute a regulatory failure
that should be corrected through a shift toward a more consolidated regulation.
The limitations fall into three categories.
First, the silo-approach is considered inconsistent. Although diﬀerent
branches of a conglomerate are exposed to similar risks, the management
of the risk depends on where it is booked due to diﬀerences in capital
adequacy requirements. It follows immediately that ﬁnancial conglomerate
may reduce aggregate capital requirements by booking risks where capital
requirements are lightest. Such regulatory arbitrage may threaten the stability
of the ﬁnancial system, and therefore, some argue that capital adequacy
regulation should be designed to prevent risk transfer across businesses within
a conglomerate. Another issue related with consistency is ‘double gearing’ of
capital, where the same capital issued by the conglomerate is being counted
twice to satisfy capital adequacy requirements in both banking and insurance.
Second limitation to the silo-approach is the problem of aggregation.N a m e l y ,
the risk assumed by a conglomerate may be larger or smaller than a sum
of its parts. Third, the silo approach is incomplete, for it does not take into
account the unlicensed entities of conglomerate that are engaged in commercial
activities which may threaten the stability of the entire organization.
4.1.1 Consistency
Consider, for instance, the current EU regulatory framework described brieﬂy
in the previous section. According to Basel 1, a bank is required to put up 4%
of Tier 1 in case of credit risk exposure when the counterparty has a rating A.
However, a conglomerate with a more diverse product variety may also book
the risk as a credit-insurance in an insurance subsidiary. In the above example
of credit-risk transfer the capital requirement for the same risk-exposure to
the insurer would be 0.8%, assuming that the insurer does not knowingly
under-price the risk and the assessment of the risk-exposure coincides with
that of the bank. Provided that the price for equity capital is the same for
both businesses, lower capital requirement in insurance suggests lower cost
for an identical risk-exposure in insurance than in banking. This naturally
generates an incentive for booking the risk in insurance company instead of
20bank. Potential for such regulatory arbitrage h a sr a i s e dc o n c e r n st h a ti tm a y
increase the insurer’s insolvency risk.
While regulatory arbitrage arguably modiﬁes the risk portfolio of the
institutions involved, it does not necessarily imply a market failure. Instead
regulatory arbitrage might improve market eﬃciency if the risks are transferred
to the market where investors are better equipped to assess and bear the
insolvency risk, and the institutions that assume the risk are not vulnerable
to contagious runs. The key in understanding this is the relation between
insolvency risk and asymmetric information is the concept of economic capital.
Economic capital is ﬁnancial ﬁrm’s own assessment of capital reserves
necessary to operate normally given its risk proﬁle and economic environment;
hence, it can be used as a common measure of risk-taking and market discipline
across businesses. In a full information environment there is a trade-oﬀ in
choosing economic capital. On the one hand, customers’ willingness to pay for
ﬁnancial services is based on the perceived value of the service, in which the
risk of insolvency plays a crucial role. On the other hand, capital reserves
are costly for institutions; hence, they have a disincentive to hold excess
capital. Under full information economic capital levels should be eﬃcient as
the debt-holders of the institutions can observe the true value of their assets
and price them accordingly.36 In an asymmetric information environment, the
institution may choose a lower level of capital as the debt-holders cannot fully
assess the risk-taking of the institution.
Regulatory capital is one instrument that regulator can use to correct for
the gap between the economic capital level and the level that obtains in
a full-information environment. The diﬀerence between the economic and
regulatory capital thus depends on customers’ and debtors’ ability to observe
the insolvency risk in the businesses. Previous section established that capital
adequacy regulation of banks is required to mitigate excessive risk taking
which is driven by lack of market discipline. Lack of market discipline in
banking reﬂects the feature that a large proportion of banks’ debt-holders
are unsophisticated depositors who are protected by deposit insurance. Since
the market does not discipline the banks, the role of the regulator is to
discourage banks from ineﬃciently high risk-taking. To this end capital
adequacy requirements can be used to create a cost for the risk that is not
priced on the market and induce banks for more prudential behavior.
Debt and policy holders of insurance companies, in turn, have less
protection from the government and a central bank. Furthermore, unlike in
banking, a large proportion of insurance companies’ debt is being held by
ﬁnancially sophisticated institutions.37 It follows that investors should have
better incentives to monitor the solvency of the insurer and price the risk more
eﬃciently. Higher market discipline implies a higher level of economic capital
in insurance business than in banking.
The aim of Basel 2 revisions is to better align the regulatory capital level
with the economic capital level that obtains under full information. It is
36That is, discipline ﬁnancial institutions for their risk-taking by demanding a higher rate
of return for their assets.
37In some countries the insurance companies have funds that serve the role of deposit
insurance.
21therefore plausible to think that capital adequacy requirements for the same
risk should be identical for all ﬁnancial institutions. However, recall that in
an ideal situation a socially optimal capital requirement equates the marginal
cost of regulation and the marginal beneﬁt in terms of reduction in expected
externalities associated with the failures. If one accepts this as a target for
ﬁnancial regulation, we may argue that the level of regulatory capital should
not be identical in insurance and banking. This is because the insurance market
should provide greater incentives for prudential risk management than in
banking and the expected cost in terms of externalities associated with market
failures tend to be lower in insurance due to lower risk of ﬁnancial contagion
and the feature that there is no counterpart to bank-runs in insurance.38
Cross-shareholding in ﬁnancial conglomerates has raised concerns for double
gearing of capital. Double gearing of capital refers to a situation in which one
entity holds regulatory capital issued by another entity with the same group
and the issuer is allowed to count the capital in its own balance sheet. Double
(or multiple) gearing of capital is likely to overstate the amount of external
capital of the group. Thus, in order to prevent multiple gearing the regulators
should have a clear deﬁnition of eligible capital and bear in mind that while
internally generated capital may provide support for individual subsidiaries it
has limited eﬀect on the solvency of the group as a whole.
To summarize, although the inconsistencies in the current regulatory
approach allows the ﬁnancial conglomerates to reallocate risk between diﬀerent
business lines, the concern for higher insolvency risk could be overestimated.
The reason being that the key mechanism that underlies the risk of insolvency,
namely lack of market discipline, diﬀers between these businesses, and hence,
insurance market should provide incentives for prudential risk management.
It follows that the silo-approach could be a suitable framework for capital
adequacy regulation of ﬁnancial conglomerates, regardless of the potential
for regulatory arbitrage. However, the prevention double gearing of capital
requires clear deﬁnitions of eligible capital, especially in terms of the role of
intragroup holdings in general assessments of group capital.
4.1.2 Aggregation
In theory, the volatility of proﬁts should decrease as the activities generating
them become more diverse. By applying this argument to ﬁnancial
conglomerates it seems plausible to think that conglomeration diminishes the
likelihood of failures in ﬁnancial markets by generating an additional safety-net
for institutions against ﬁnancial distress. Hence, risk diversiﬁcation should
reduce the regulatory capital levels applied to ﬁnancial conglomerates. On
the other hand, a similar line of reasoning indicates that the silo-approach
neglects risk-concentration. For example, an acceptable level of credit risk in
a stand-alone institution’s banking book may become a concentration of risks
with high correlation if other institutions under the same roof have exposures
to same counterparty in their risk portfolio.
38A similar point is made by Morrison (2003).
22In a practical level, the extent to which risk diversiﬁcation and
concentration should be taken into account in the design of optimal capital
adequacy requirements depends on the regulator’s ability to measure the
risk correlations. The quantiﬁcation of the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts has been
conducted in a few studies. However, as noted by Berger (2000) the results
are far from conclusive and there are studies which argue that regardless of
diversiﬁcation beneﬁts, ﬁnancial conglomerates’ overall risk may increase due
to increase in systematic risk.39 Since the existing literature provides little
support for diversiﬁcation beneﬁts, the argument that diversiﬁcation calls for
lower capital adequacy requirements for ﬁnancial conglomerates is less clear
and requires more robust empirical evidence.
In addition to the measurement problems, also the theoretical predictions
for risk aggregation are ambiguous. In principle, diversiﬁcation requires that
when a ﬁnancial crisis hits, say an insurance subsidiary, the bank within the
same conglomerate should rescue it through recapitalization. This feature
has two important implications. First, it leaves the bank exposed to a
risk of internal contagion which represents a threat to ﬁnancial stability. If
the legislation, however, does not require the bank to bail out the failing
subsidiaries, the rationale for reducing capital adequacy requirements due to
aggregation would be lost. The second implication is that when a subsidiary
is required to ﬁnance the one that is failing, the subsidiaries may exhibit
diminished incentives to manage their own risk portfolio prudentially. This
argument is developed by Boot and Schmeit (2000). Boot and Schmeit show
that when a conglomerate consists of two branches with separate managers,
their operations might become distorted by ‘Moral hazard in teams’ -eﬀect.40
The intuition is that when subsidiaries are committed to provide additional
ﬁnance to the one that is failing, the additional safety-net diminishes the
subsidiaries’ incentives to invest prudentially.
These arguments can be summarized as follows. The extent to which risk
diversiﬁcation improves the eﬃciency on ﬁnancial markets lacks unambiguous
empirical evidence. Furthermore, risk aggregation implies a higher risk of
contagion between business lines in a conglomerate, which could reduce market
discipline and increase the systemic risk. It follows that reducing capital
adequacy requirements on the basis of risk diversiﬁcation, could have severe
implications on the ﬁnancial stability.
4.1.3 Incompleteness
Financial institutions that do not oﬀer insurance or banking services are
unlicensed for they are not subject to similar failures as banks and insurers.
This is because unlicensed subsidiaries do not oﬀer liquidity insurance to
debt-holders and they are subject to standard bankruptcy procedures. This is
common knowledge for each debt-holder and they will plan their investments
accordingly. Therefore, a run generated by investor-panic should not represent
39See Allen and Jagtiani (2000).
40See Holmström (1982).
23a risk in unlicensed institutions. Second, since unlicensed subsidiaries are not
oﬀering insurance services they are not subject to the various problems of
asymmetric information in insurance market. Finally, most debt-holders of
unlicensed ﬁnancial ﬁrms are sophisticated investors; therefore, the subsidiaries
are subject to similar market discipline as other organizations in ﬁnancial
market.
These are the basic reasons why some institutions are not being licensed
as speciﬁc ﬁnancial institutions in the ﬁrst place and why the debt-holders
of these institutions do not require government protection. Hence, extending
capital adequacy requirements to unlicensed subsidiaries might be unnecessary
as there are several other instruments the regulator can use to insulate
the conglomerates against internal contagion eﬀects within a conglomerate,
eg deﬁnitions of eligible capital and ﬁrewalls. Extending capital adequacy
requirements to unlicensed entities would only exert distortions on the market.
To sum up these arguments I infer that unlicensed subsidiaries are not
subject to socially costly failures, hence, there is little reason to extend capital
adequacy requirements to these companies. However, unlicensed subsidiaries
impose increased risk of contagion when there is no regulation of cross-sectoral
ownership within the conglomerate. Contagion risk should therefore be
corrected through policies that control for excessive cross-ownership of assets
between subsidiaries.
4.2 Too-big-to-fail policies
The cross-sectoral consolidation of ﬁnancial institutions is fueling a public
policy debate on the implications of the size and complexity of ﬁnancial
institutions on the ﬁnancial system stability. Several authors argue that large
ﬁnancial institutions receive implicit subsidies through too-big-to-fail (TBTF)
policies.41 Emergence of ﬁnancial conglomerates has also raised concerns
that complex international ﬁnancial institutions may receive similar beneﬁts
through too-complex-to-fail (TCTF) policies.
TBTF policy refers to a particular form of time inconsistency in ﬁnancial
regulation that may lead to moral hazard in large banks. When a ﬁnancial
institution becomes large enough, the regulator might be induced to extend the
ﬁnancial safety net beyond standard policy measures to prevent system wide
ﬁnancial crisis. Its unintended consequence is a market perception that when a
ﬁnancial crisis hits an institution that qualiﬁes as TBTF, the government will
provide reﬁnance regardless of the circumstances that led to the crisis. Such
implicit insurance system gives large institutions an advantage over small ones
which is unrelated to their ability to manage risk and thereby increasing the
vulnerability of the ﬁnancial system.42
The recent trend toward conglomeration combined with globalization and
innovation of new ﬁnancial products which allow for reallocation of risks
41See eg Mishkin (1999).
42Morgan and Stiroh (2002) provide evidence that banks considered TBTF are subject to
less strict market discipline than small banks.
24across sectors, implies that ﬁnancial conglomerates might be considered
too-complex-to-fail.43 The reasoning is that ﬁnancial crisis of complex ﬁnancial
institutions may propagate more easily across business lines and countries
through cross-holding of assets. Therefore, governments have an incentive to
engage in costly interventions to reﬁnance failing institutions so as to prevent
widespread failures of a ﬁnancial conglomerates.44 As in case of TBTF policies
TCTF policies diminish the market discipline giving a competitive advantage
to complex ﬁnancial conglomerates over stand-alone institutions.
In theory, the regulator can correct for excessive risk taking through
supplementary regulation applied to institutions that are considered to be
TBTF or TCTF. In practice, however, applying supplementary regulation
requires ﬁrst a clear deﬁnition of legal entities subject to supplementary
regulation. Second, quantiﬁcation of the eﬀect of TBTF-principle on the
ﬁnancial conglomerates risk is not readily available. These complications
combined with the constant evolution of the ﬁnancial sector imply that
it is quite unlikely that the regulator can design eﬃcient supplementary
requirements. Instead of capital adequacy regulation, failures associated with
TBTF principle should be corrected through improving procedures dealing
with insolvent ﬁnancial conglomerates.45 This entails a commitment to a
particular bankruptcy process with clear deﬁnitions of relevant legal entities.
These deﬁnitions with suﬃcient transparency requirements and ﬁrewalls to
prevent excessive inter-bank lending, should provide correct incentives for the
agents in the ﬁnancial market to price the risks associated with each ﬁnancial
institution regardless of their size or structure.
5 Conclusion
It remains to be seen how Basel 2 revisions of the capital accords will eventually
treat ﬁnancial conglomerates. Thus far, the public-policy discussion has
focused on the limitations of the current silo-approach in regulation of ﬁnancial
conglomerates and on implications of too-big-to-fail policies on ﬁnancial
fragility. In particular, advocates of free ﬁnancial markets are concerned that
extending the standards to non-banking institutions will inevitably lead to
ineﬃciently high deadweight loss, which cannot be justiﬁed on the basis of
ensuring ﬁnancial stability. However, some argue that the current regulatory
framework leaves the ﬁnancial market exposed to costly failures, and therefore,
the capital adequacy requirements should be extended to institutions that do
not provide traditional banking services.
One suggested limitation of the silo-approach is inconsistent capital
adequacy requirements between product lines which allow the institutions to
engage in regulatory arbitrage. Although regulatory arbitrage may well change
43See, Herring (2002).
44In addition to TBTF and TCTF principles, there is a potential that ﬁnancial
conglomerates become too-big-to-save. That is, reﬁnancing a failing institution may be
too costly for governments.
45For more detailed information on the issue see Mayes and Liuksila (2004).
25the risk-proﬁle of the involved institutions, it is less clear whether it generates
a market-failure that requires regulatory attention. The reason is that the
extent to which the market disciplines institutions for their risk-taking diﬀers
between ﬁnancial sectors and the social cost of failures are unlikely to be the
same between insurers and banks. A risk-transfer to a sector with lower capital
adequacy requirements reﬂecting lower risk of insolvency and lower potential
for contagious failures may actually improve the eﬃciency, provided that the
market responds adequately to changes in the institutions’ risk proﬁle.
The concern for risk aggregation refers to the property that the
silo-approach ignores risk diversiﬁcation. While some argue that diversiﬁcation
reduces the volatility of proﬁts and thereby the risk of insolvency, the
empirical evidence on these gains is ambiguous. Furthermore, some analytical
predictions also suggest that diversiﬁcation may increase systematic risk
through internal contagion eﬀects.
The silo-approach is also considered incomplete as unlicensed subsidiaries
are not subject to capital adequacy requirements. Unlicensed subsidiaries are
not subject to similar failures as licensed ﬁnancial institutions. Hence, the fact
that these institutions are not being licensed in the ﬁrst place constitutes a
suﬃcient justiﬁcation for not extending the capital adequacy requirements to
these institutions.
Although ﬁnancial conglomerates may well be considered too-big-to-fail or
too-complex-to-fail, the policy response should be directed to improvements
in bankruptcy legislation and regulation of the structure of the conglomerates’
risk-portfolio. This is because the TBTF principle can be diﬃcult to quantify
and supplementary regulation applied to ﬁnancial conglomerates requires a
clear deﬁnitions of institutions that qualify as ﬁnancial conglomerates. If
the TBTF principle is taken into account in industry-wide capital adequacy
regulation, it might impose an unnecessary deadweight loss on the market.
These arguments suggest that economic literature lacks unambiguous
empirical evidence and clear theoretical predictions on the risks associated
with ﬁnancial conglomerates. Hence, before modiﬁcations of capital adequacy
requirements takes place, more rigorous economic analysis is needed to address
the potential market failures. Meanwhile, the focus should be on improving the
transparency of the new, more complex, ﬁnancial institutions and providing
clear deﬁnitions of eligible capital to prevent cross-ownership of assets and
enhance the market discipline.
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